The officer shortage in the United States Army Reserve has reached critical levels and the overall impact threatens the longterm health of the organization. Insufficient recruiting, low accessions, and increased officer attrition driven by a multitude of internal and external factors have all contributed to these shortages. Significantly, the shortage of junior and mid-grade officers can derail current efforts to transform the US Army Reserve (USAR) from its traditional role as a strategic reserve into its current use as an operational reserve. Unfortunately, corrective measures have done little to mitigate this problem. These short-term expedient measures have satisfied deploying unit requirements but failed to address the underlying management issues causing these shortages. This paper briefly examines the background leading to current shortage of junior and midgrade officers in the USAR; it then evaluates the officer manning challenges and highlights the related contributing factors in recruiting, accessions, and retention. The paper proposes several long-term policies and process changes to help resolve officer shortages and concludes with an assessment of the ability of the USAR to meet continued GWOT readiness requirements.
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Significantly, the shortage of junior and mid-grade officers can derail current efforts to transform the US Army Reserve (USAR) from its traditional role as a strategic reserve into its current use as an operational reserve. Unfortunately, corrective measures have done little to mitigate this problem. These short-term expedient measures have satisfied deploying unit requirements but failed to address the underlying management issues causing these shortages. This paper briefly examines the background leading to current shortage of junior and mid-grade officers in the USAR; it then evaluates the officer manning challenges and highlights the related contributing factors in recruiting, accessions, and retention. The paper proposes several long-term policies and process changes to help resolve officer shortages and concludes with an assessment of the ability of the USAR to meet continued GWOT readiness requirements.
AN INSTITUTION IN CRISIS: THE ARMY RESERVE OFFICER CORPS
The Army Reserve is facing a critical junior-and mid-grade officer shortage that has persisted since the end of the Cold War. When asked how this situation occurred, LTG Helmly, Chief of Army Reserve (CAR), bluntly testified to Congress "we had folks… asleep at the wheel." 1 The severity of this shortage is an impediment to achieving unit readiness and hinders the on-going transformation of the US Army Reserve (USAR) from a Strategic Reserve into an Operational Reserve. Operational requirements drive the model that generates forces from all components on a sustained and cyclical basis. 3 ARFORGEN prioritizes and synchronizes "institutional functions to resource, recruit, organize, man, equip, train, sustain, source, mobilize, and deploy cohesive units more effectively and efficiently." 4 In doing so, ARFORGEN manages the structured progression of increased readiness of units through preparation, training, ready, available, and deployment statuses.
Correspondingly, the transformation of the RC within the context of ARFORGEN implementation has surfaced numerous resourcing challenges primarily resolved through 'makeshift' management efforts including personnel and equipment 'cross leveling' that cannibalizes other non-deploying units. Although successful in meeting rotational operational demands, these makeshift processes have obscured and, in some cases, delayed or prevented the resolution of many other issues that affect the longterm viability and health of the RC in general and the USAR in particular. Many of these obscured issues may come to the fore as the Army begins to limit mobilization to 12-month increments and confines mobilizations of combat, combat support and combat service support organizations to existing 'unit' organizations and restricts personnel cross leveling and stop-loss measures. 5 With these new constraints, the USAR will need to confront the severe shortage in low and mid-grade officer manning and develop long-term management reforms to meet the readiness and deployment requirements inherent in the train-mobilize-deploy ARFORGEN framework. 6 This paper briefly examines the background leading to current shortage of junior and mid-grade officers in the USAR; it then evaluates the officer manning challenges and highlights the related contributing factors in recruiting, accessions, and retention.
The paper proposes several long-term policies and process changes to help resolve officer shortages and concludes with an assessment of the ability of the USAR to meet continued GWOT readiness requirements in the face of growing officer disaffection and continued institutional ineptness.
Background
The Figure 1 ). 11 The chart shows responses to the question of "how likely is it that you will be serving in the Military in the next few years?" 12 According to the survey, following the initial period of euphoria associated with the successful toppling of Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, the propensity of likely candidates has progressively declined from a high of 23 % in
November '03 to the current level of 13% (June '07). 
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Clearly, there are numerous factors influencing the proclivity of eligible candidates to serve in the military, some of which can swing in favor of its desirability.
However, those factors dissuading eligible candidates that are associated with the prospects of repeated deployments in support of the 'persistent conflict' are likely longterm negative influencers that portend an even further decline. Even in 'steady-state' conditions, the projected routine operations tempo will likely cause irreparable damage to junior and midgrade officers' budding civilian careers and negatively affect the families of those officers. At the junior and mid-grade levels, these officers usually have younger children, marital relationships that are more fragile, dual employment of both spouses, and are more highly leveraged with housing mortgages and personal debts.
These factors all combine to discourage reserve service that can place civilian employment in jeopardy and require frequent absences from homes and families.
Compounding these negative influences are the limited health care benefits for nonmobilized RC soldiers and a relatively poor retirement incentive that does not commence until after serving 20-years of equivalent creditable service and they reach age 60. Similarly, those RC officers predisposed to routine deployments and regular service commitments are more likely to transition from reserve to active status while still early in their career. Faced with the prospect of routine and repetitive deployments in the RC, it simply becomes more rewarding for soldiers to accrue greater benefits on active duty doing these same activities and they avoid any conflicts with civilian employers.
The net effect of these factors is to discourage volunteers, increase attrition, and entice officers into inter-component transfers. If these issues were only a result of the current long-running GWOT, it would be problematic enough, however, given that the officer shortage is now in its second decade it may become catastrophic to the long- 
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Generally, the Army looses 10% of the available lieutenants each year for failing to attend BOLCII within the required period. In response, the Army is implementing several initiatives to address the retention problem, however; these initiatives are largely uncoordinated and are limited to shortterm measures. For instance, to entice mid-career officers to stay, the Army is offering a $35,000 retention bonus to captains. The problem with offering bonuses is there is no way to ensure the money actually goes to those who are contemplating departure since it must be offered to all captains. Moreover, even after offering bonuses to all captains, attrition rates for captains remain at about 14% annually indicating that this type of solution is likely insufficient to resolve even the current attrition challenge. 34 Although likely affecting a certain portion of those choosing to remain in the USAR, additional measures of this sort will probably have a decreasing rate of return. First, because monetary compensation is only one of many factors influencing the departure of junior officers and second because the amount of monetary compensation will likely have to increase in a non-linear rate with every incremental increase in retention numbers.
As previously indicated, it takes a lifetime of developmental assignments and education to produce senior leaders competent at the tactical through strategic levels.
Consequently, the shortages in junior and mid-grade officers will pose a serious challenge for the development of the number and quality of leaders at the higher levels.
Low numbers of mid-career officers have already caused promotion selection rates to be higher than normal. The shortage is so severe that USAR promotion boards have had to resort to promoting all fully qualified officers rather than selectively promoting the best-qualified candidates. This threatens major problems for the future Army and has an immediate negative impact on the officer corps. Currently, there is only an educational requirement for USAR promotions from lieutenant through lieutenant colonel. The variety and density of potential qualifying positional assignments prevents using key developmental or branch qualifying positions as a prerequisite for promotion.
Additionally, RC officers generally are limited to available positions within their geographical area and would have to forfeit their civilian employment and move at their own expense to take USAR positions outside of commuting distance. 35 Nonetheless, in a fully manned and competitive environment, those officers aspiring to be 'best qualified' would likely seek the challenging and difficult jobs as a competitive edge over those who relied only on educational qualification. Conversely, in the current environment with all 'fully qualified' officers being selected for promotion there is no incentive to take on the challenging, high-demand jobs, seek opportunities to deploy on high visibility operational missions, or otherwise accept risk. In fact, the system actually penalizes officers who do choose these options. Many officers who take positions that are more challenging, such as primary staff or command, also struggle to complete schooling, as well as remain competitive in their civilian careers. In the meantime, other officers who take less time-consuming positions, attend the minimum amount of unit training, and limit their participation to accomplishing just the required schooling receive promotions at the same if not higher rates.
This pervasive impact of officer shortages has emerged in promotion board actions. For instance, on a recent board, 800 officers failed to meet educational requirements for their grade. Seven hundred of these officers were currently deployed or had previously deployed and some were in command. 36 The key aspect of this promotion approach is that every board since 2001 has had to exclude significant numbers of otherwise eligible officers from promotion for failing to meet the educational requirements. Many reasons exist for officers failing to meet these prerequisites. cases from the previous year. 40 Of course, complaints capture only those overt violations of the act but do not address more subtle employer discretionary measures that can discriminate against reservists when major downsizing of the workforce takes place or when selecting employees for promotion or advancement. Nonetheless, the increasing number of complaints is a clear indicator that multiple mobilizations are now extensively affecting employers and upsetting that fragile balance between civilian employment and reserve duty.
Correspondingly, in some cases employers are forced overtly to discriminate against reservists. While the law may protect soldier's rights to reemployment, the expense of employing a reservist is not sustainable for many small business owners. In many cases, it is a matter of business survival. Despite appeals to patriotism and threats of legal action, many employers simply cannot afford to leave jobs unfilled or repeatedly train and employ part-time replacements for the increasing absences of their reservist employees. Another population disproportionally affected is first responders. 41 Generally, the same skills and propensities that motivate citizens to join the military are the same that motivate them to seek public service in emergency response organizations. Thus, when small police and fire departments lose several highly skilled reservists (many times in key leadership and management positions), the consequences on the emergency response capability can be severe for both the agency and the public. This again creates additional pressure on the citizen-soldier to choose between his responsibilities to the local public and his continued service to the Nation in the USAR. Added to this pressure is the impact of increasing OPTEMPO.
The modern reservist can now expect multiple activations during a twenty-year career in the USAR operational reserve. While this new reality may be the current standard, the average reservist did not anticipate this requirement when they joined the organization. Hence, the effects on retention and accessions caused by the transformation into an operational reserve, as opposed to a less demanding strategic reserve, may not be sustainable without significant incentives and benefits especially in health care and employer subsidies. Although the Employer Partnership Program capitalizes on the needs of industry and the training proficiencies of select reservists, it is probably limited to select occupational specialties with little application to officer-like management or leader executive positions. 42 As LTG Stultz, Chief of the Army Reserve, recently stated, "I think the success to sustain an all volunteer force in the reserve components is going to have to be that the Reserve Soldier looks and says being in the Army Reserve is going to enable me to have a career in my community.
" 43 Yet no overarching strategic plan exists to comprehensively deal with these issues. Similarly, the Army Reserve should consider aligning all personnel functions under a major commander. The advantage is to have one commander developing and implementing one overarching and synchronized plan that will take a recruit from the recruiter through MOS qualification to unit membership in a coordinated and systemic manner. It requires a 'Personnel Czar' committed to bringing all of these resources together. Placing a General Officer in charge of a strategic plan to access and retain officers is essential to ensure that the program receives adequate attention and the authority for dealing with the issue as a whole and not its separate parts.
Conclusions
The viability of the officer corps is at a serious crossroads. This is neither a new problem nor one that the Army or its Reserve Components can correct anytime soon.
There are many challenges facing the operational Army Reserve, as well as the Army as a whole. The Operational Reserve is no longer a concept…it is a reality. How and 'if' this challenge can be met with the current personnel management policies and programs is still in question. Clearly, an imminent and growing problem of junior and mid-level officer shortages threatens the ability of the USAR to transform into an operational reserve. Across the recruiting, accessions and retention functional areas exists a broad array of possible reform measures that could help reverse the reduced accessions and increased officer attrition. However, the most promising measures require an integrated and comprehensive approach that cuts across functional areas and even components. Any remedy or policy that promotes competition between components for the limited number of potential officers needs eliminating. Alternatively, a unified personnel policy that attracts officers to meet all three components requirements is necessary. The USAR , and indeed the Army, should adopt a comprehensive cross-functional strategy that: improves opportunities for required education; increases opportunities for selected direct commissioning; better manages TPU officer careers; establishes a continuum of service; increases benefits; offers employer incentives; and improves TPU officer development plans and cross component officer management.
That a serious officer accession and retention problem exists is not in doubt,
whether there is any institutional momentum to aggressively confront and fix the problem for the long-term is the real question. In a constrained resource environment, priorities will have to be set; but the resolution of current officer shortages should be at the top of that list.
Endnotes
officer level is open to question. The basic premise of the program is that some industries such as trucking companies are finding it hard to hire qualified employees. The Army Reserve screens, trains, and provides experience to truck drivers, and thus has a ready pool of qualified persons who can pass drug screenings and have their licenses and in many cases have combat leadership experience. Thus, certain businesses have a need for and are willing to hire these personnel even in the face of multiple RC generated absences. From the business perspective, intermittent employment by highly qualified and trained employees is better than having no employees. The Army Reserve has many of the type of individuals some of these candidate industries require. This program, while still in its infancy, has General Officer involvement, and has companies from airlines seeking mechanics to metropolitan police departments looking for police officers ready to participate.
